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judgment only to the extent of the amount stated in the complaint.39 If such
defendant appears, the complaint cannot be amended to include a new cause of
action.40
Similarly, a non-resident defendant who does not appear in response to a sum-
mons served with notice will be subject to a default judgment to the extent of
the amount stated in the notice.41 But, under the authority of Everitt v. Everitt,
the similarity ends there. If this non-resident defendant should choose to appear
and defend, he subjects himself to any further cause of action the plaintiff might
substitute or add.
As stated in Seeley v. Greene:
42
* . . [W]hen the plaintiff served a notice with his summons, the defendant was jus-
tified in assuming that the plaintiff was seeking to recover a judgment on contract only
S.. and was not seeking a judgment in tort .... There being no authority for the
service of such notice in tort action, the service was an indication that the plaintiff
was not suing in tort ....
It is granted that the decision in the Everitt case may be a possible interpre-
tation of the New York Civil Practice Act, the Restatement of Conflict of Laws
and even the Restatement of Judgments. A summons served with notice is not
technically a summons served with a complaint and no new causes of action are
added when the complaint is eventually made. But under our accepted notions of
justice, due process and fair play, it is not reasonable to believe that the decision
reached by the court in the Everitt case was the result intended by the New York
legislature in this situation; rather that the legislature did intend that, when
notice be given under these facts, it would be as restrictive upon accompanying
summons as a complaint.
Robert L. La Vine
LABOR: COUNTIES RECOGNIZED AS "PERSONS" UNDER TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
A recent federal court decision seems to have placed political subdivisions in a
favored position under the Taft-Hartley Act. In N.L.R.B. v. Local 313, Inter-
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO,' the court held that a
county is a "person" as defined by that act. The cases and rules of statutory con-
struction alike indicate that the weight of authority favors a contrary interpre-
tation.
The Local 313 case arose through a controversy between the union and New
Castle County, Delaware. The County Airport Commission awarded contracts for
the construction of an airport passenger terminal to three firms, one of which
(Furness) was non-union. The union set up a picket line at the airport to pressure
the county into terminating its contract with Furness. As a result the construction
project was unable to continue. The picketing was held to constitute a secondary
boycott against the county, and was illegal under Taft-Hartley Section 8(b)
(4) (A), which makes it unlawful for a union
2
39 N.Y. CIv. PRAC. AcT § 486.
40 RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §5, comment g (1942).
4 1 N.Y. CIV. PRAC. AcT § 486.
42 139 Misc. at 91, 247 N.Y.S. at 680.
1254 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1958).
261 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (A) (1952).
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to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in ... a concerted
refusal in the course of their employment ... to perform any services, where an object
thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring any employer or . . . other person . . . to cease
doing business with any other person .... (Emphasis added.)
There is no question that a governmental body, such as New Castle County,
can be injured by a secondary boycott. The cases seem to draw no distinction
between a governmental unit and any other general contractor on this point.
3
The main issue was whether or not the county was a "person" under Taft-
Hartley. To obtain an N.L.R.B. order restraining Local 313 from further picket-
ing, the county had to qualify as either an "employer" or a "person" under Taft-
Hartley. It could not qualify as an employer. Section 152 (2) of the act provides
that:
4
The term "employer" . . . shall not include the United States . . . or any State or
political subdivision thereof.
The reason Congress made these exceptions is that "employer" was a technical
term under the National Labor Relations Act (N.L.R.A.). Under that act, only
an "employer" can bargain collectively with its employees.5 Congress, in adopting
the original N.L.R.A., "did not recognize the existence of the right of collective
bargaining in public employment" 6 and did not intend to establish any such right.
The rationale for this is that private employers are more likely to exploit their
workers than are public bodies. Hence workers in private industry need the pro-
tection afforded by collective bargaining, while public employees generally do not.
Since a governmental unit cannot bargain collectively with its employees, it cannot
be an "employer." This interpretation was carried over into the Taft-Hartley Act,
which is merely a revision of the N.L.R.A.
Thus New Castle County, barred from an "employer" status, had to attain
recognition as a "person," since only an "employer" or "other person" can be
injured by a secondary boycott under section 8 (b) (4) (A). There were difficulties
here, however, as Taft-Hartley Section 152(1), which defines certain terms used
in the act, goes into considerable detail in defining a "person" but does not spe-
cifically include governmental bodies:
7
The term "person" includes one or more individuals, labor organizations, partnerships,
associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or
receivers.
In determining whether or not a county is a "person" under any statute, the
primary factor is legislative intent. Did the legislature intend that a given statute
include counties as "persons"? 8 In the Local 313 case, the N.L.R.B., reversing
its former position on congressional intent, overruled two of its own previous de-
cisions, as did the Court of Appeals in affirming the Board's order.
One of the overruled decisions was Al J. Schneider Co., Inc.,9 where the facts
were similar to those in the Local 313 case. In Schneider the Board held that a gov-
3 31 Am. JuRa. Labor § 575, at 849 (rev. ed. 1958).
461 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1952).
5 NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
6Nutter v. City of Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App. 2d 292, 168 P.2d 741 (1946).
761 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(1) (1952).
8 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 317, at 557, § 321, at 560-71 (1953); 50 Am. Jui. Statutes § 223,
at 200-03 (1944).
9 87 N.L.R.B. 99 (1949), aff'd, 89 N.L.R.B. 221 (1950).
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ernmental body was not to be included in Taft-Hartley's definition of a "person."
This decision was based upon two grounds: (1) Taft-Hartley's detailed enumera-
tion of the entities constituting a "person" indicated Congress' intent to exclude
governmental bodies in that they were not mentioned. (2) To hold otherwise
would be unfair to unions, for a governmental body, if recognized as a "person,"
could bring an action against a union for unfair labor practices, but this same
body, not being an "employer," could not itself be guilty of unfair labor practices.' 0
The Schneider decision seems in line with the appropriate rules of statutory
construction. Legislative intent is the controlling factor." Such intent is to be
drawn mainly from the language of the statute itself,' 2 especially where the lan-
guage does not appear ambiguous.13 The language in Taft-Hartley is not ambigu-
ous. It clearly indicates who and what are to be considered "persons." The omis-
sion of counties does not seem inadvertent, for if they had been included they
would have received favored treatment. It can logically be assumed that Congress
intended no such favored treatment.
The other case overruled was Victor M. Sprys,14 in which the Board followed
Schneider and held that the Army Corps of Engineers was neither an employer
nor a person under the act.
Schneider and Sprys were both based upon the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in U.S. v. John L. Lewis.15 There the Court, in interpreting the definition of
"person" under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, held that since Congress had specifi-
cally provided that the term included partnerships, corporations, and associations,
it was clearly Congress' intent to exclude all types of organizations not men-
tioned. Hence, said the Court, the United States government (and any other gov-
ernmental body) is not a person under this statute.
While definitions of a term in one statute cannot arbitrarily be applied to the
same term in another statute,16 the court in Schneider held that the same reason-
ing applied to both Norris-LaGuardia and Taft-Hartley.
In the Local 313 case, however, the court found a basis for overruling these
prior decisions in the "piggy-back" case.17 There the Supreme Court had held that
a railroad company, while unable to qualify as an "employer" under Tart-Hartley,
is nevertheless not "excluded" from being held a "person." Hence the railroad
company, as a "person," was able to obtain some relief through the N.L.R.B. 18
The Court of Appeals applied this reasoning to a county. A county was not
"excluded" as a "person"; therefore it, too, could be accorded such recognition.19
The court conceded that its decision is subject to argument, and that there
was no "established authority" upon which to base its decision.20 It might have
10 89 N.L.R.B. at 223.
11 See note 8 supra.
1282 CJ.S. Statutes § 322(b), at 571-76 (1953); 50 Am. JuR. Statutes § 227, at 210-12
(1944).
13 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 322 (b) (2), at 577-88 (1953) ; 50 Am. JTUR. Statutes § 225, at 204-09
(1944).
14 104 N.L.R.B. 1128 (1953).
15 330 U.S. 258 (1946).
16 82 CJ.S. Statutes § 315, at 539 (1953).
17 Local 25, Teamsters Union, AFL, v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 350 U.S. 155 (1956).
's Id. at 160.
19 254 F.2d at 224.
20 Ibid.
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